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Abstract
We investigate the effects of “contractionary” monetary shocks by
imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of macroeconomic
variables up to six months while allowing industrial production and
exchange rate to be completely determined by the data. We show
that i) the effect of an adverse monetary policy shock on industrial
production is ambiguous; ii) there is price puzzle for Japan and UK
which we conjecture as an outcome of excessive bank lending and poor
regulation but not of passive monetary policy; iii) there is delayed
overshooting puzzle for Japan and the exchange rate puzzle for the
UK and the US.
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1 Introduction
The fundamental theoretical and empirical question in monetary economics
centers on understanding whether money and monetary policy have any im-
pact on real economic activity. To that end monetary economists have been
particularly interested in investigating the validity of the benchmark theories
focusing on the impact of monetary policy shocks that lead to economic fluc-
tuations. In their analysis, they often resort to using a vector autoregressive
(VAR) framework, developed by Sims (1980), to describe and understand the
behavior of prices, monetary aggregates, interest rates and output, as well as
to conduct policy experiments.
The popularity of VAR approach can be attributable to the fact that
these models validate dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els under certain sign restrictions.1 In fact, it is well known that linear or
log linear approximations of Markovian DSGE models around the steady
state yields VAR(1) solutions which are complicated functions of the un-
derlying preference, technology and policy parameters.2 Hence, extracting
meaningful results from a reduced form VAR is a difficult task and requires
cross-equation restrictions which should be credible and uncontroversial. In
general, to solve the identification problem in the model, researchers impose
constraints either on the short run or the long run impact of monetary shocks
on macroeconomic variables. There are two main approaches to solve the
identification problem. The first approach, followed by Sims (1988), Bernake
and Blinder (1992) and Bernake and Mihov (1998) among others, requires a
recursive identification scheme known as the Cholesky decomposition where
policy shock affect output with a lag. The second approach (see Blanchard
and Quah (1989) and Gali (1992) among others) achieves identification by
imposing zero restrictions on the long-run impact of monetary disturbances.
However, the identification of structural economic shocks based on zero
restrictions has been repeatedly stressed in the VAR literature that this ap-
proach has various shortcomings. Cooley and Leroy (1985) argue that iden-
tification based on the Cholesky decomposition is unsatisfactory because this
approach is not consistent with the DSGE models. Canova and Pina (1999)
show that DSGE models do not imply the recursive structure imposed by the
1More concretely, Ireland (1999) show how a real business cycle model can be written
as a VAR(1). The first order conditions of a DSGE model and log-linearisation around
the steady state lead to a system of rational expectation (RE) model. Also note that
conventional solution of RE models using Blanchard and Kahn (1980) method gives a
VAR(1).
2See, for instance, Leeper, et al. (1996) Christiano et al. (1999) and Canova (2007)
who summarize the developments of VAR models and empirical findings.
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Cholesky decomposition. Cooley and Dwyer (1998) show that the long-run
restrictions used by Blanchard and Quah (1989) rely on weak instruments
and lead to unreliable conclusions concerning the differentiation of perma-
nent shocks from transitory shocks. Further research (see Chari et al (2005),
Giordani (2004) and Benati and Surico (2009) points out that for a certain
class of DSGE models VARs are unable to trace out both the true dynamics
of state variables and the true shocks even if the appropriate identification
restrictions were used. This is so because the log-linearization of these mod-
els leads to a VARMA data generating process (DGP).3 If one of the roots
of the MA component is large then a finite order VAR would not necessarily
capture the true DGP. However, Canova (2006) and Canova and Cambetti
(2010) show that when VAR method is properly used then the true DGP can
be properly recovered.
Given the criticism regarding the use of zero restrictions in identifying pa-
rameters of a VAR structure and the fact that DSGE models do not exhibit
zero restrictions, researchers began to use sign restrictions to validate DGSE
models. This reasoning is due to the observation that a log-linearized DGSE
model rarely delivers zero restrictions to extract structural shocks, they con-
tain many sign restrictions which could be used to identify the model (see
Canova (2007) page 138).
In this paper, taking into account the developments in the field, we in-
vestigate the impact of monetary shocks for three developed countries con-
sidering a Bayesian structural VAR model as suggested by Uhlig (2005) and
Mountford and Uhlig (2009). This methodology identifies structural mone-
tary shocks by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of (some)
variables while allowing some other variables to be completely determined by
the data. This approach is useful because it avoids some of the identification
problems that arise in the traditional structural VAR models. In our case, we
impose no restrictions on the responses of industrial production and exchange
rate to monetary policy shocks as they are the key variables of interest in
this study and we want the data to determine their path. Our dataset covers
the period between January 1988 to December 2009 on a monthly bases and
collected for the UK, the US and Japan.
It is worth stressing at this point that although most of the results in the
3Benati and Surico (2009) using a three-equation New-Keynesian model show that if
there is a structural change in the policy rule (i.e., from passive to active) then a VAR
analysis will detect this as the variance of the shocks has changed. However, Benati and
Surico (2009) can be criticized on the grounds of omitted variable problem which induces
biased coefficients and overestimated variance of shocks. To that end, Canova (2006)
states that an augmented VAR including a proxy of the omitted variable (i.e. expected
inflation), may uncover the true DGP.
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VAR literature are consistent with the economic theory, Sims (1992) using
a recursive identification approach observed a positive relationship between
prices and interest rate.4 Sims argues that the price puzzle is possibly an
artifact of the omitted variables problem. In other words, because the central
bank has more information concerning expected inflation than a researcher
can incorporate in a VAR model, the finding that interest rate rises in re-
sponse to expected high inflation can only be explained due to the omission
of a fundamental variable from the model. Recently, Castelnuovo and Surico
(2010) show that price puzzle is the by-product of a passive monetary policy
with respect to inflation. More concretely, if a central bank accommodates
instead of fighting inflation, that is if a central bank follows a passive policy,
then this would generate indeterminate multiple equilibria and expectations
become self-fulfilling. Thus, high inflationary expectation will be fulfilled by
a passive monetary policy leading to expectation for even higher inflation.
This implies that the Sims’ argument is correct only when monetary policy
is passive.
Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, similar to
Uhlig (2005), we find that a “contractionary” monetary policy shock, does
not necessarily lead to a fall in real GDP. For instance, in the US, we find
that the real industrial output growth stays positive for the entire 5 year
period following a contractionary monetary shock. In Japan the real indus-
trial production growth does not respond much to the monetary shock for
several months but then it slightly increases after the middle of the second
year following the shock; however, this response is small and negligible. In
contrast, the real industrial production growth in the UK declines for the
entire period following the negative shock. Second, although the response of
prices is tainted due to the sign restriction, it is interesting to note that we
do observe the price puzzle for the UK and Japan when we consider the full
sample. We conjecture that the price puzzle in these two countries is not an
outcome of passive monetary policy but it is related to excess bank lending
over the period prior to the financial crises. Third, when we inspect the be-
havior of real exchange rates, we observe delayed overshooting in Japan and
the exchange rate puzzle in the UK and in the US.5, 6
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the methodology, section 3 provides information on the data and illustrates
4Eichengreen et. al. (1992) named this anomaly as a “price puzzle”.
5For all the countries the real exchange rate is measured with respect to the US dollar
whereas the real exchange rate for the US is measured against the SDR. All real exchange
rate variables are drawn from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).
6Scholl and Uhlig (2008) report the presence of the exchange rate puzzle for US-
Germany, US-UK, US-Japan.
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the results of the VAR analysis in terms of impulse responses and variance
decomposition. Finally, Section 4 offers some concluding observations.
2 The Bayesian VAR model and identifica-
tion
We empirically investigate the impact of a contractionary monetary policy
shock on the economy especially that on output and exchange rate. We
construct a VAR system that consist of real industrial production, exchange
rate, money market rate, total reserves and consumer price index and fol-
low the identification approach suggested in Uhlig (2005) by imposing sign
restrictions. By construction, the growth rate of real industrial production
and that of the real exchange rate are the focus of interest and we do not
impose any sign restrictions on these variables. However, we restrict the im-
pulse responses of monetary and price variables to identify monetary policy
shocks.
2.1 VAR model
Consider the reduced form VAR model:
Yt = Φ1Yt−1 + Φ2Yt−2 + ....+ ΦpYt−p + ǫt (1)
= Φ(L)Yt + ǫt (2)
where Yt is a n × 1 vector of data at time t, Φ(L) is a polynomial in the
lag operator L of order p and ǫt is the error term. Identification of econom-
ically meaningful shocks requires a sufficient number of restrictions on the
underlying structural model. For instance, let ut = A
−1ǫt is a n × 1 vector
of independent structural shocks such that:
E(uu′) = Σu = In
where In is an identity matrix of order n and A is an n × n matrix. Iden-
tification of ut requires the researcher to impose n(n − 1)/2 restrictions on
matrix A. In the VAR literature this is done through the recursive ordering
of variables:
Σǫ = E(ǫt, ǫ
′
t) (3)
= AA′
5
where A is the Cholesky factor of Σǫ.
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2.2 Sign-Restriction Approach
Instead of using the standard approach which we briefly discussed above,
Uhlig (2005) and Mountford and Uhlig (2009) achieve the identification of
the VAR model by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses of a
group of variables. These two papers demonstrate that any impulse vector
a ⊆ Rn can be restored if there exists an n−dimensional vector q of unit
length such that that a = A˜q where Σǫ = AA
′ = A˜A˜′, and A˜ is the lower
triangular Cholesky factor of the covariates matrix, Σǫ. Note that A˜ = AQ
where Q is an n× n orthogonal matrix.
According to Uhlig (2005) the estimation and inference can be imple-
mented as follows. A prior of the Normal-Wishart for (Φ̂(L), Σ̂ǫ) can be
constructed and the posterior draws are obtained from the Normal-Wishart
for (Φ̂(L), Σ̂ǫ). After estimating Φ(L) and Σǫ from the posterior draws, we
draw q̂j from a uniform distribution, divided by its length. Then, we con-
struct a candidate impulse response vector α̂j = A˜q̂j and compute its impulse
responses by:
rs = [I − Φ̂(L)]
−1α̂j (4)
where rs is the vector of the impulse responses at horizon s. We account for
only those draws of q̂j where the sign restrictions are not violated. We repeat
this procedure until we obtain 1000 draws which satisfy the sign restrictions.
Next, using these draws we construct the error bands.
The advantage of using sign restrictions to identify policy shocks is that
results are not affected by the ordering of the variables. That is changing
the order of the variables in a system would not render any difference in the
observed impulse response functions. In addition Bayesian VAR (BVAR) is
not subject to parameter uncertainty. This is so because the BVAR allows
us to compute the reduced-form parameters and the impulse vector simulta-
neously.
3 Data and Results
In this section, we present our results that we generate using the pure sign-
restriction approach. We carry out our analysis using monthly data which
7Recursive identification imposes short-run restrictions based on an ad-hoc ordering.
This method was used by Sims (1986). Alternatively, Blachard and Quah (1989) identified
structural shocks by imposing n(n− 1)/2 long-run restrictions on C(1) = [I − Φ(1)]−1.
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covers the period between January 1988 and December 2009 for the US, the
UK and Japan. We compare and examine the results gathered from these
three countries to understand how monetary policy shocks affect output, ex-
change rate and prices. Our empirical model is similar to that of Bernanke
and Mihov (1998) and it is well studied in the literature. Our investigation
makes use of real industrial production, commodity price index, total re-
serves, the real exchange rate and short-term interest rate. The data on the
interest rate are taken from line 60b of the International Financial Statis-
tics. Data for total reserves are taken from line 12 of the same source and
it represents total reserves minus gold. Data on the consumer price index
(CPI) and the industrial production are extracted from lines 64 and 66, re-
spectively. Last but not least, the real effective exchange rate is taken from
line 42. Note that the real effective exchange rates of the UK and Japan are
measured with respect to the US dollar. The real exchange rate for the US is
given with respect to the SDR. Given the definition of the real exchange rate
series, an increase indicates a real depreciation whereas a decline indicates a
real appreciation. We use the logarithmic first difference of each variable in
our VAR system with the exception of the short-term interest rates which is
used in levels.
We built our VAR model allowing for 12 lags in the logarithmic difference
form of the series with the exception of the short-term interest rates which
is used in levels. To achieve identification of the VAR system, we impose
that the response of inflation and growth of total reserves would not increase
and that of money market rate would not decrease for the first six months
following the monetary policy shock; i.e. s = 6.
3.1 General Observations
We have three sets of key results. The first set is about the effect of mone-
tary policy shocks on real output. We find that a negative monetary policy
shock does not necessarily lead to a contractionary effect on real industrial
production. It is possible that the ambiguous effect of monetary policy on
economic growth is related to the response of the financial sector to changes
in monetary policy. Given our observations, it appears that transparency and
a well behaving financial sector can restore the confidence in the economy so
that the uncertainty surrounding the future economic growth and inflation
can be deflated to a large extent. More specifically, our findings suggests that
sunspots are not necessarily generated due to the implementation of passive
monetary policies but due to the actions of a poorly regulated financial sec-
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tor.8 Hence, it might be more important to (re-)institute a well functioning
financial system prior to meddling with the monetary policy to achieve full
economic recovery.
Second, when we consider the full data, we do find evidence for the pres-
ence of the price puzzle for the UK and Japan. Evidence of the price puzzle
begs an answer to the question on the underlying factors that generate this
indeterminancy. Although, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) argues that the
indeterminacy is due to violation of the “Taylor principle”9 their suggestion
is not consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting by the BoE or the
inflation averse policies followed by the BoJ.10 We conjecture that the mech-
anism that generated sunspots both in the UK and in Japan was related to
the excess bank lending that took place before the periods of crisis that both
countries went through. A sharp increase in bank-lending accompanied by
poor bank regulation can easily lead to speculation and mal-investment. Un-
der such circumstances a crisis can easily spiral into poor economic conditions
as both countries experienced. We show that this anomaly disappears once
the periods of crises are removed from the analysis. It seems that without
establishing a well functioning and a well regulated financial sector, it would
be hard to achieve economic recovery.
Our third set of results relates to the behavior of the real exchange rates
of the countries in our sample. We find that the reaction of exchange rates
to monetary policy shocks is not identical across all three countries. In par-
ticular, there is evidence of a delayed overshooting puzzle for Japan.11 In
contrast, for the UK and the US we find evidence for the exchange rate puz-
zle; depreciation of the real exchange rate in response to the contractionary
monetary policy.
It is worth noting that within the framework of a typical delayed over-
shooting model, as demonstrated in empirical studies including that of Eichen-
8This conjecture perhaps does not correspond to the US reaction to monetary policy
shocks due to its size and the way it is governed.
9The Taylor principle states that if the coefficient of inflation in the standard Taylor
rule is smaller than one, then the rational expectations model has multiple equilibria and
the expectations become self-fulfilling.
10Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) argue that the association of indeterminacy with passive
monetary policy is model specific. Dupor (2001) shows that in a continous time model
with endogenous investment passive monetary policy is consistent with determinancy.
However, in the New-Keynesian widely used in the literature to analyse the monetary
transision mechanism of interest rate shocks, passive monetary policy is the generated
mechanism of indeterminancy.
11Essentially, this means a desecration of the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
which is called as the ‘forward discount puzzle’. It is important to note though that there
could be a forward discount puzzle even with no delayed overshooting.
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baum and Evans (1995) and Grilli and Roubini (1995, 1996), the value of
exchange rate overshoots its long-run level in response to a monetary shock
and reaches its peak after one to three years rather than instantaneously as
the Dornbush’s overshooting model suggests.12 Hence there is a critical dis-
agreement between the standard theory and the baseline evidence regarding
the effects of monetary policy shocks on the behavior of exchange rates.13
Recently, Faust and Rogers (2003) argue that the delayed overshooting is an
artifact of the recursive identification scheme. In particular, they show that
there is no evidence of delayed overshooting model once mild sign or shape
restrictions are imposed to identify monetary policy shocks. Yet, Scholl and
Uhlig (2008) restore the delayed overshooting puzzle by imposing sign re-
strictions on the impulse response functions.
3.2 Empirical Results
Figures 1 to 7 show the impulse responses for Japan, the UK and the US to a
“contractionary” monetary policy shock for different sample periods. Figures
1, 4 and 7 plot the impulse responses for the full sample for each country,
respectively. Figures 2 and 3 presents the impulse responses of Japan to a
contractionary monetary policy when we use shorter periods as we investigate
the role of crises. We follow a similar strategy regarding the effects of crises
periods for the UK on the response of variables to monetary policy shocks.
In particular Figures 5 and 6 depict the response of the UK economy as we
exclude the periods of EMS currency crisis and the recent financial crisis.
The Case of Japan
When we inspect Figure 1, we observe that a contractionary monetary policy
shocks have unclear effects on the real industrial production of Japan. Real
industrial production growth does not respond to the shock for the first two
and a half years after which it starts to increase. Overall, the reaction of
industrial production growth in Japan is around the baseline level suggest-
ing that a contractionary monetary shock does not create large fluctuations
in industrial production. Evidence that adverse monetary shock is not an
important source of fluctuation in Japan’s economy is consistent with the
12The delayed overshooting puzzle is also named as the forward discount puzzle due to
a violation of uncovered interest rate parity. It is worth noting that a forward discount
puzzle might exist even if there is no delay overshooting. See also Leeper et. al. (1996),
Clarida and Gali (1994) and Kim (2001).
13Dornbusch’s (1976) famous overshooting model, which predicts that an increase in
the domestic interest rate relative to the foreign interest rate leads to an immediate ap-
preciation followed by a depreciation of the domestic currency to its long-run equilibrium
level.
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fact that Japanese monetary authorities faced nearly-zero interest rates for
most of the period that we explored in this study. Thus, when the economy
experiences a recessionary shock, monetary authorities cannot stimulate the
demand by decreasing interest rate since the nominal interest rate cannot
go below zero. Put it differently, zero bound interest rate reduces the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy; should the economy face a shock on aggregate
supply or demand, monetary policy cannot be used to return the economy
back to its equilibrium.14
We next turn to examine the behavior of consumer prices. By construc-
tion inflation cannot increase in the first 6 months following the negative
monetary policy shock. But then inflation begins to exhibit an increasing
trend; although inflation remains below the baseline level for almost two
years, it becomes positive and increases for the rest of the period. On av-
erage there is mild evidence of the price puzzle which might be an artifact
of omitted variables problem as suggested by Sims (1992) and Castelnuovo
and Surico (2010). In particular, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) argue that
in a New-Keynesian model the omitted variable problem is the by-product
of a passive monetary policy which leads to indeterminacy. Indeterminacy,
as Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) stress, is an outcome where policy shocks
are not uniquely identified and sunspots become important in generating
business cycles and affecting the equilibrium. Hence, structural VAR models
(SVAR) would be misspecified should one mistakenly omit forward-looking
variables such as expected inflation. Under such circumstances, monetary
policy shocks will not be identified properly.
We presume that the price puzzle is surfacing here due to the economic
crises that Japan went through over the late 1980s and early 1990s. In par-
ticular, recall that the bank of Japan (BoJ) during this period followed an
expansionary monetary policy to mitigate the impact of Yen’s appreciation
in order to comply with the 1985 Plaza Accord. The expansionary mone-
tary policy, along with the current account surplus, led to excess liquidity
in the financial system fueling financial assets and real estate prices. During
this period, the Japanese monetary policy authorities were also concerned
about the possibility that inflation would surge as a consequence of the de-
velopments in the economy. To counteract a potential surge in inflation, BoJ
doubled the bank rate. Yet, they were then slow to reduce it. The increase
in the bank rate exerted a negative impact on real estate and stock prices
resulting in an increase in the number of loan defaults. The negative impact
14Baba et al. (2004) show that although the ratio of money base to GDP doubled after
1995, deflation has persisted. They also argue that evidence of recession and deflation was
due to the low and even negative growth rate of bank loans.
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of loan defaults on the economy was further exacerbated as Japanese banks
ended up with the final bill in the form of bad loans. The damage was done:
bad loans, continuous increases in the number of defaults and reduction in
real estate and stock prices paved way to a deflationary environment making
demand side policies ineffective.
Given the negative and protracted nature of the crises in Japan, we con-
jecture that the presence of the price puzzle could be due to excess lending
and poor banking regulation that was in effect prior to the financial crisis.
To provide evidence to our conjecture, we generate the impulse responses for
the post-crises period so that we can circumvent the indeterminacy possibly
induced by the inclusion of this period in the analysis. Figure 2 depicts our
observations for the 1992-2009 period. When we concentrate on the behav-
ior of prices, we see that although prices fall and remain below zero for the
whole period there is still a tendency in prices to increase following the third
year. Once we exclude the 2007-09 period from the analysis the price puzzle
disappears fully. However, as Figure 3 shows, while the reaction of the other
variables do not change, it now appears that the adverse monetary shock has
a negative effect on industrial production growth.
When we turn to analyze the movements in the real exchange rate, we
observe in Figure 1 that the Japanese Yen appreciates following the monetary
policy shock for a year and then settles around its baseline as the value of the
currency does not appear to change much (although there is some evidence
of depreciation following a year and a half of the shock, this is very mild).
Thus, there is evidence of delayed overshooting following the contractionary
monetary policy shock. However, the delayed overshooting in Japan might
be a mirror response to the price puzzle. More specifically, exchange rate
initially appreciates to mitigate the effects of expected inflation and then
depreciates. Once we exclude the periods of financial crises the delayed
overshooting disappears.
The case of the UK
We next inspect the results for the UK. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses
of the variables when we use the full data. In general, we observe that the
industrial production growth falls following a contractionary monetary policy
shock. However, this drop is not too large. As expected, inflation initially
falls due to the restriction that we impose for the first 6 months. Afterwards
inflation increases reaching a peak by the end of the first year while it remains
above the baseline for the rest of the period. Yet, the deviation of inflation
from the baseline is negligible after the four years following the shock.
Similar as in the case of Japan, the positive relation between inflation and
interest rate could be due to the fact that the UK economy went through
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a period of crises in early 90s. In this period, in conjunction with the Ger-
man unification and the subsequent contractionary monetary policy that
Germany implemented, the UK economic outlook deteriorated and unem-
ployment increased substantially. However, to reduce unemployment, the
British government could not stimulate economic growth by devaluating the
British pound because the UK was a member of the ERM. The option for
the UK, at that time, were either to opt out of the ERM and achieve higher
economic growth by devaluing the domestic currency or to remain in the
ERM and suffer a severe recession. The market bet in favor of the former
option leading to a speculative attack on the British pound in September
1992. Given this panorama of the UK economy, it appears that the devalua-
tion expectations and the subsequent inflation expectations could as well be
the underlying mechanism for the price puzzle that we observe in the data.
To test for this possibility, we repeat the analysis concentrating on the post
1992 EMS currency crises period to remove the immediate effects of this pe-
riod of uncertainty. As in the case of Japan, we also estimate the impulse
responses by excluding the recent financial crisis. Figures 5 and 6 which cover
the period between 1995-2009 and 1995-2007, respectively, provide evidence
supporting our explanation that the price puzzle disappears once periods of
crises are removed from the data.
Our results are consistent with Benati (2008) who using a time-varying
coefficient structural VAR (TVC-SVAR) shows that there is a violation of
the “Taylor principle” during the entire decade of the 80s. The UK joined the
ERM on October 1990 and opt out of the ERM in September 1992. The long-
run coefficient on inflation is estimated to fluctuate between 0.7 and 0.8 before
the UK joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). During the ERM, the
interest rate differential between the UK and Germany declined from 2.3 to
0.4 (see Gross and Thygesen 1998). In line with the empirical regularities,
Benati (2008) estimates a temporary decrease in the long-run coefficients on
inflation and output growth during the ERM period. However, after the
introduction of inflation targeting in October 1992, following the suspension
of the EMS membership, the long-run coefficients on inflation and output
increased substantially, reaching 1.4 and 0.9, respectively. This observation
suggests that the “Taylor principle” is not violated over the period following
the introduction of inflation targeting to the current financial crisis. To put
it in other words, although there was a violation of the “Taylor principle”
before the EMS crisis, this was not the case for the period prior to the recent
financial crisis.
The behavior of the British pound exhibits an interesting reaction to
monetary policy shocks. We observe that the real exchange rate depreciates
after a contractionary monetary policy shock in all three graphs providing
12
evidence in favor of an exchange rate puzzle which might be consistent with
the presence of a price puzzle. More specifically, within the Frankel’s (1979)
overshooting model an increase in the interest rate will lead to depreciation
only if the expected inflation is higher than nominal interest rate.15 This ex-
planation accords with the observations in Figure 5 where the depreciation of
real exchange rate becomes explosive after two years following the monetary
policy shock.
The Case of the US
Finally, we concentrate on the behavior of the US economy to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. Figure 7 shows our observations. The re-
action of the US economy to a monetary policy shock has been studied by
several researchers including Uhlig (2005), Scholl and Uhlig (2008) and it is
pleasing to see that our findings in general align with theirs. We observe that
the industrial production growth in the US increases at first and then falls
towards the baseline supporting Uhlig (2005) that a contractionary monetary
policy does not necessarily lead to a contraction in the economy. When we
turn to observe the behavior of prices, we see that inflation falls for the first
six months reflecting the restrictions that we impose. Furthermore, inflation
remains below the baseline for most of the time and it does not appear to
have a tendency to increase although it exhibits some cyclicality.
Similar to the UK, the real US dollar, which is measured against the SDR,
exhibits the exchange puzzle: the US dollar depreciates following a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. This might be due to a forward discount
puzzle where violation of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) is driven by
the existence of forward risk premium. Here, the risk premium implies that
the forward premium is higher than the expected devaluation. This result
along with the behavior of other variables in our VAR are in line with Scholl
and Uhlig (2008) and Fratzscher at al. (2010) who found strong evidence for
a forward discount premium in four developed countries.
15Frankel’s overshooting model suggests that the deviation of exchange rate form its
equilibrium value depends on the real interest rate differential:
st = s−
1
θ
[(it −Π)− (i
∗
t
−Π∗)]
where st is the current exchange rate, s is the equilibrium exchange rate it, is domes-
tic nominal interest rate, i∗
t
is foreign nominal interest rate, Π is the long-run domestic
inflation rate and Π∗ is the foreign long-run inflation rate.
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3.2.1 Evaluation of the Results
Our results have strong policy implication for all there countries but mainly
for those which experience the price puzzle: the UK and Japan. Throughout
the period under investigation, although both Japan and UK attempted to
defuse contraction in their economies by implementing monetary and fiscal
policy tools to boost demand, both countries failed to achieve their goals.
Following the financial crises of the late 80s, the BoJ reduced the rate of
interest to zero and kept it at that level as the government increased its
expenditures to stimulate the economy. There was a reluctance to use a
quantitative easing, because even when Japan experienced deflation, BoJ was
averse to possible future inflation. Similarly, the recent financial crisis that
erupted in the USA forced the BoE to reduce the bank rate to unprecedented
low levels while, different from the BoJ, increasing the money supply to
support the demand side of the economy.
When we turn to observe the reaction of the Labour government which
was in power during the 2007-2009 financial crises, we see that the govern-
ment implemented expansionary fiscal policies and strived hard to convince
governments in continental Europe and the US to do the same. In contrast,
the subsequent Tory—Lib-Dem coalition government that took power in 2010
restructured the fiscal policy to achieve a medium to long-term reduction of
fiscal deficit and national debt. Under the current situation it is debatable
that the two sets of (conflicting) policies implemented by the BoE and the
government will push the country to its long-run growth path rather than
to a low equilibrium where growth will be too slow for a protracted period
into the future. More concretely, given that the monetary policy had limited
impact on the demand side as experienced in Japan, USA and the UK16, the
coalition government might have been too quick to attempt to reduce gov-
ernment expenditures to keep the public expenses in check. This complete
reversal of the UK fiscal policy may have further undesirable consequences
as inflation in 2011 is on the rise as a result of increases in fuel and wholesale
commodity prices inducing inflation expectations of the public.
Furthermore, the presence of the price and exchange rate puzzles im-
plies that sunspots could have significant effects on the business cycle. In
particular, it may be the case that pessimism about the future economic
circumstances might have introduced further negative feelings on the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy in Japan and in the UK. Although the earlier
research has shown that the price puzzle or sunspot is a by-product of passive
16Quantitative easing did not lead to inflation in Japan in the past. During the recent
crises, although both FED and BoE injected substantial amounts of cash into the financial
system, the rate of inflation in both countries did not change.
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monetary policy, our observations for the UK and Japan are not consistent
with this view. The reason is that over the period of investigation and impor-
tantly during the financial crisis, monetary policy makers in both countries
played a very active role. Given the evidence, we suggest that the underlying
factor to sunspots is excessive bank lending and poor bank regulations. In
Japan banks kept funding its customers before the financial crises as long as
the borrower was able to provide a collateral in the form of real estate. This
strategy worked well while the real estate prices were stable or increased over
time and the economy was not overheated as the asset bubble formed which
eventually happened in Japan in the 1990s and in the USA in 2007. However,
once the bubble burst this practice imposed immense negative effects both
on financial and real economic sector. In the case of the UK, Haldane et al.
(2007) show that UK banks increased their unsecured exposures along with
UK households secure debt to figures around 32% of UK bank’s total lend-
ing. Haldane at al. (2007) also explain that households were very sensitive to
adverse shocks and there were signals of stress with the number of personal
insolvencies sharply increasing before the 2007-2009 financial crises.
It is also worth stressing that in the UK the price puzzle might have been
the mirror response of the exchange rate puzzle and vice-versa. More specif-
ically, expected depreciation of pound fuels expected inflation and expected
inflation further increases expected depreciation. The fundamental question
is why there was an expected depreciation or an increase of expected inflation
in the first place. Is it due to bad policy or due to bad lack? In our view it
is due to a combination of both for the UK and due to bad policy in Japan.
Although in both countries the driving force behind expected inflation was
excess lending prior to the crises, the new element in the 2007-2009 financial
crisis is the increases in commodity prices and oil prices that happened con-
currently. Under such circumstances policy makers have to identify which
part of expected inflation is generated by supply shocks (i.e. oil price, food
prices etc.) and which part of inflation is generated by sunspots. The latter
in both countries was a result of poor bank regulation which after the cri-
sis led to an uncertain economic environment undermining the effectiveness
of monetary and fiscal policy concerning the future economic growth. Our
results suggest that any decision to increase the interest rate by the BoE
should be associated with demand factors that affects expected inflation.
However, expected inflation is due either to supply shocks or to bad policy
prior to the recent financial crisis. Thus, an increase in interest rate will not
only undermine future economic growth but it might also issue wrong signals
concerning the credibility of BoE monetary policy committee.
As a final step of our empirical study we perform a variance decomposi-
tion analysis. Table 1 shows the variance decomposition of all variables for
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all three countries in response to an interest rate shock. We can see that
movements in monetary policy is responsible for a small fraction of the state
variables’ movements in any of these countries. More concretely, monetary
policy explains at about 20 percent of the variability of any of the variables
included in the VAR system. Last but not least within each group of coun-
tries the variance decomposition is relatively the same.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the impacts of monetary policy shocks on output,
exchange rate and prices using data from the UK, the US and Japan. We
carry out our investigation implementing an agnostic identification method
recently proposed by Uhlig (2005). In this framework, to achieve identifica-
tion we impose sign restrictions on domestic short-term interest rates, prices
and total reserves for the first six months following the contractionary shock.
We apply no restrictions on real exchange rate and output so that the impulse
responses of these variables are completely determined by the data. Regard-
ing the restrictions that we impose, we follow the conventional wisdom and
assume that a contractionary monetary policy shock does not lead to a fall
in domestic short-term interest rates, does not increase domestic prices and
does not increase total reserves. We have three sets of observations.
First, the response of real output to adverse monetary policy shocks is
ambiguous in a way that in most cases it does not have a significant impact
on output as the response can be positive as well as negative. Therefore,
we cannot be as comfortable as before when commenting on the impact of a
contractionary monetary shock on the output.
Second, we observe price puzzle for Japan and UK when we use the full
sample period during which both countries experienced 2 two distinct periods
of crises including the recent 2007-2009 financial crises. We argue that the
price puzzle is an artifact of excess lending and poor banking regulations. Ex-
cess lending prior to financial crises created inflationary expectations which
in the case of UK have been further enhanced by depreciation of the home
currency. In other words, we conjecture that the price puzzle in Japan and
the UK is not a by-product of passive monetary policy, as the central banks
were active through out the sample period, but rather it is an outcome of the
poor regulation of the banking system which led to a lending boom and infla-
tionary expectations. Our results suggest that the appropriate tool to satisfy
market expectations and to restore public confidence is through increasing
the transparency of banking system and introducing a better financial regu-
latory system.
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Third, we show that the exchange rate puzzle occurs in the UK and the
US while we observe the delayed overshooting for Japan. Empirical evidence
suggests that in Japan exchange rate responds to mitigate expected inflation
while in the UK and the US exchange rate response accommodates expected
inflation.17
Last but not least, the results in this paper suggest that monetary policy
shocks can explain only a small part of the variation in output and prices.
Quantitatively, monetary policy shocks seem to have a negligible effect on
exchange rate fluctuations as well as output, in contrast to some of the lit-
erature.
17In an attempt to explain empirical findings of delayed overshooting theoretical research
such as Gourinchas and Tornell (1996, 2002) argue that delayed overshooting is the by-
product of learning the current state and the intrinsic dynamic if interest rate reaction to
monetary shocks.
17
Figure 1: Japan: Full Sample (1988-2009)
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Figure 2: Japan: Post Financial Crises? 1992-2009
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Figure 3: Japan: 1992-2007
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Figure 4: The UK: Full Sample (1988-2009)
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Figure 5: The UK: Post ERM Crises (1995-2009)
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Figure 6: The UK: Post ERM Crises (1995-2007)
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Figure 7: The US
Impulse Responses with Pure-Sign Approach
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Table 1: The variance decomposition
Fraction of Variance for IP Growth 6 month 12 month 24 month
Japan 10 % 14 % 16 %
United States 10 % 14 % 16 %
United Kingdom 11 % 17 % 20 %
Fraction of Variance for Inflation
Japan 22 % 21 % 20 %
United States 15 % 20 % 18 %
United Kingdom 18 % 22 % 23 %
Fraction of Variance for Exchange Rate Growth
Japan 11 % 13 % 17 %
United States 16 % 20 % 22 %
United Kingdom 12 % 15 % 20 %
23
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